Labor Relations and Attorneys\u27 Fees by Edwards, Charles A.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 54 | Number 6 Article 2
9-1-1976
Labor Relations and Attorneys' Fees
Charles A. Edwards
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles A. Edwards, Labor Relations and Attorneys' Fees, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 1161 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol54/iss6/2
LABOR RELATIONS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
CHARLES A. EDWARDSt
Perhaps no facet of litigation is of more interest to attorneys than
the availability of court-awarded fees. The discussion in this article
limits itself to one aspect of that topic: the availability of court-
awarded fees in what may broadly be classed as labor relations cases.
Various federal statutory provisions may be invoked in the context of
alleged infringement of employee rights. These include civil rights
legislation spanning more than a century,' labor legislation originating
with the New Deal,2 and special statutory provisions covering fair labor
standards, age discrimination, equal pay for equal work, duties to
employees arising out of contractual relations and arbitration, and job
safety requirements. 3
With respect to attorneys' fees, these statutes fall into two general
categories: those that expressly provide an award of fees to the "pre-
vailing party" if the court in its discretion sees fit to award fees, and
those that are silent on the subject.4 Such a classification may well be a
distinction without a difference in the employment area.
t Member, Atlanta, Georgia Bar. A.B., Davidson College; S.D., University of
North Carolina.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1870,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Title
VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-6, e-8, e-9, e-13 to e-17 (Supp. IV, 1974).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 152, 153, 158, 161, 169 (Supp. IV, 1974); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-63 (1970).
3. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 202-08, 210, 212-14, 216 (Supp. IV, 1974); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 630, 633a, 634 (Supp. IV, 1974); Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 441 (Supp. IV, 1974).
4. It can also be said that there are three classifications: (1) statutes that make
attorneys' fees mandatory, such as section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974), and the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act relating to enforcement of National Railroad Adjustment Board or-
ders, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 153 ( 'First') (p) (1970); (2) statutes that make the award
of counsel fees discretionary, as in Title VIE of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1970), and the inspection of records and fiduciary duties provisions
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431(c) & 501(b)
(1970); and (3) statutes that make no reference to compensation for prevailing counsel,
such as the National Labor Relations Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and the Equal Pay Act, cited in notes 2 & 3 supra.
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I. THE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The courts have continually reiterated, "The general rule, apart
from statute, is that the prevailing party in litigation is not entitled to
recover any sum for his attorneys' fees."5 This "American rule," unlike
that prevailing in British jurisprudence, has been justified on the ground
that a burden on the courts would result by compelling judicial determi-
nation of the reasonableness of fees.6 As one court simply put it,
Note also the provision for "attorney's docket fees" in 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1970),
which was mandatory from 1853, 10 Stat. 161, until made discretionary in 1948, 62
Stat. 956. One writer has recently set out at least twenty federal statutes permitting
the allowance of attorneys' fees. Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal
Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Ac-
cess]. Another writer, Senator Tunney, states that there are twenty-nine. Tunney,
Foreword, Financing the Cost of Enforcing Legal Rights, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 632,
633 (1974). Several such statutes have issued from the 93d Congress. See note 210
infra.
5. D. DoaBs, HANDBooK ON TE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.8, at 194 (1973); see, e.g.,
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). The so-
called general rule was commonplace in the United States as early as 1796. See, e.g.,
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). See also Goodhart, Costs, 38
YALE LJ. 849 (1929).
But as one historian notes, lawyers were not always paid at all. In 1773 Thomas
Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and five of their colleagues announced in the press that they
"would give no opinion on any case without the payment of the whole Fee." The
reason was that during Jefferson's first six years of practice, he collected less than
one-third of his billed fees. F.M. BRoDm, THoms JmmRF soN, AN INTimATxr HISToRY
(1974), quoting Virginia Gazette, May 20, 1773.
6. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d
288, 298 (9th Cir. 1969). At least one court has stated that the departure from the
English model was intentional. Conte v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F.2d 664,
672 (2d Cir. 1960). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. Fed. 643 (1973); Annot., 8
L. Ed. 2d 894 (1963). Be this as it may, the American rule has come under fire
in no fewer than a dozen scholarly works: Avilla, Should Counsel Fees Be Allowed?,
13 STATE B.J. OF CALIF. 42 (1938); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 792 (1966); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE_ L.J. 849
(1929); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L.
REV. 75 (1963); Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System,
55 IowA L. REv. 26 (1969); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expense of Litigation
as an Element of Damages, 15 MwN. L. REv. 619 (1931); Stirling, Attorney's Fees:
Who Should Bear the Burden?, 41 STATE B.J. oF CALU'. 874 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel
Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 202 (1966);
Note, Attorney's Fees, 43 MIss. L.J. 238 (1972); Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element
of Damages, 15 U. Cnm. L. REv. 313 (1941); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Should the
Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VMD. L. Rnv. 1216 (1967); Note, Distribution of Legal Ex-
pense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940).
An objective and heavily footnoted analysis is Professor Dawson's two-part study,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARv. L Rnv. 1597
(1974), and Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 849 (1975). 6ee generally F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116
(1974). An excellent discussion is found in Judge Celebrezze's decision in Incarcerated
Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974).
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"attorneys are paid by their clients."7 Both statutory and judge-made
exceptions to this general rule, however, have become increasingly
apparent.
The court sitting in equity has the power to tax attorneys' fees as
costs when equity would demand such a practice. This doctrine was
enshrined in American jurisprudence by Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank," and has expanded to the point that
the general rule is much more accurately stated as follows: "[The
award of attorneys' fees] necessarily requires a permitting statute, a
contractual obligation, or equitable discretion in the trial court."9
The theoretical bases advanced for fee-shifting are beyond the
scope of this article, although many will be touched upon peripherally. It
is perhaps more significant that there, is a lack of any consistent legisla-
tive or judicial application of these theories in practice. The prevailing
theme underlying departures from the American rule is the protection of
interests that, absent a reward in the form of fee-shifting, might not be
protected adequately by the bar.10 Implicit in such a theme is the idea
that without fee-shifting plaintiff's attorney would not be paid; this idea
is, in many instances, far from true.
Curiously, the only treatise devoted to the subject of attorneys'
fees,"1 while containing excellent discussions of the various theories of
fee recovery, devotes less than four of its 1300 pages to what it calls
"civil rights" cases-yet it is in this specific area of the law that a great
deal of judicial flesh has been added to the statutory bones of such
phrases as "prevailing party," "reasonable attorney's fee," and "good
faith," along with references to "private attorneys general," "therapeutic
value," and other similar concepts that have spilled over into the deliber-
ations of judges and Congressmen.
7. In re Joslyn, 224 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1955) (Swaim, J).
8. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). This concept was early utilized in labor cases involving
discrimination, see, e.g., Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th
Cir. 1951).
9. Williams v. Kimbrough, 415 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1061 (1970).
10. A brief analysis of this subject by an eminent trial judge is found in Richey,
Attorneys' Fees: A Two-Pronged Problem, 11 TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1975, at 59: "Those
who sanction the award of attorneys' fees state that such fees are necessary because
a party who recovers an award for an injury is not really made whole unless his attor-
neys' fees are added to the recovery."
11. S. SPEISER, ArrON-nys' FEES (1973) (2 vols.).
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II. TITLE VII AND NEWMAN
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 permits the court to tax
attorneys' fees as costs; this discretionary power has been interpreted to
mandate a fee award when plaintiff prevails, although the converse is
not true. Section 706(k) of the Act provides: "In any action or
proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the [Equal Employment Opportunity]
Commission [EEOC] or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person."1 3 Similarly, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), including its Age Discrimination in Employment
provisions, allows "a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defend-
ant" upon a finding that the Act has been violated. 4
The two statutory provisions appear to be distinguishable. Where-
as the award of attorneys' fees under the FLSA is "mandatory and
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-
6, e-8, e-9, e-13 to e-17 (Supp. IV, 1974) (prohibiting employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex or national origin).
13. Id. § 2000e-5(k) (1970) (emphasis added). Note the express exception of
the EEOC and the Justice Department from further consideration.
14. Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974) (providing a private remedy for violation of federal minimum wage
and overtime standards). See Bable v. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 287 F.2d 21
(3d Cir. 1961); Rau v. Darling's Drag Store, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Retail Store Employees Local 400 v. Drug Fair-Community Drug Co., 307 F. Supp.
473 (D.D.C. 1969); Foster v. Irwin, 258 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1966).
This section applies to the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), cited in note 3 supra, as well. See Hodgson v. Miller Brewing
Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972) (Equal Pay Act); Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975) (ADEA); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1971)
(ADEA). See generally CCH WAGE-HouR REP. i 25,970.
The "mandatory and unconditional" language of the Fair Labor Standards Act pro-
visions, see text accompanying note 15 infra, should be clarified: the award is per-
missible only on individual or class-based private actions under section 16(b) of the
Act, and not to suits brought pursuant to section 17 by the Secretary of Labor. Simply
stated, this translates into a policy determination that there is no need for a private
attorney general's incentive compensation when the public is actually assuming the con-
duct and expense of enforcing the statute. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 400 F. Supp.
993 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The presumption that an enforcement agency can and will per-
form its statutory mission should be indulged in to resolve any doubt against the con-
ferring of fees for "coattail" litigation. McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir.
1976); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972); Office of Communication v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In securi-
ties litigation, attorneys' fees may be denied if the benefit to plaintiffs resulted from
acts of the government rather than those of plaintiffs' attorneys, Wechsler v. Southeast-
ern Prop., Inc., 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), or if an experienced investor has not
been inveigled into a purchase, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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unconditional,"' 5 the allowance of counsel fees pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act is specifically discretionary. Nonetheless, the
judicial gloss in decisions under Title VII and Title II makes it clear that
such discretion, if it exists, applies only to the amount of such fees; the
award is compelled if the party "prevails."
In reaching this conclusion, the courts have relied upon the Su-
preme Court's statement in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.6
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would
have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law. A Title H suit is thus private in
form only.... Congress therefore enacted the provision for coun-
sel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance
arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to en-
courage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief under Title II.
It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction
under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'
7
Although Newman was dealing with the attorneys' fees provisions
of section 204(b) of the 1964 Act,18 and despite the explicit recognition
in Newman that "[w]hen a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II],
he cannot recover damages,"' 9 federal courts soon entertained the "pri-
vate attorney general" concept in Title VII litigation.0
15. Wright v. Carrigg, 275 F.2d 448, 449 (4th Cir. 1960). The reasons for FLSA
attorneys' fees were ably stated by Judge Wyzanski in Hutchinson v. William C. Barry,
Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 296-98 (D. Mass. 1943). See also Rau v. Darling's Drug Store,
Inc., 388 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
16. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
17. Id. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted). This "special circumstances" language is
distinguished in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975), as inapplica-
ble in the context of back pay awards; the standard applied to back pay is "avoidance
of frustration of the central statutory purposes." Id. at 421. This distinction, admit-
tedly, is less than pellucid.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) (dealing with discrimination in public accom-
modations; the language is similar to section 706(k) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970))).
19. 390 U.S. at 402.
20. In Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968), the Fifth
Circuit stated: "Clearly the same logic applies to Title VII of the Act." Id. at 499.
The Oatis court cited Newman in the context of permissibility of a class action in the
absence of individual EEOC charges, and not with respect to attorneys' fees. Earlier
decisions under the 1964 Act had adhered to the language of the statute. For example,
in Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Miss. 1965), the trial court exercised
its discretion to deny taxing attorneys' fees as costs when the prevailing party was rep-
resented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., because plaintiff had
incurred no "obligation to pay." Id. at 475. This interpretation would be entirely cor-
rect if the case had proceeded under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which contains a
1165
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The first appellate decision regarding Title VII attorneys' fees as
affected by Newman was Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.21 The Fourth
Circuit was faced with a "test case" which Judge Boreman's dissenting
opinion characterized as "'ambulance chasing'-with the plaintiffs
themselves serving merely as puppets or as pawns in the game.
'22
Plaintiffs had applied for work where no vacancies existed; they were
not seeking jobs, but were attempting to test Cone Mills' employment
practices. The trial court granted injunctive relief but denied back pay
and attorneys' fees. 23
The court of appeals affirmed the back pay denial but reversed as
to attorneys' fees on the Newman rationale. Judge Boreman's dissent
reflected a strong distaste for such a procedure. In addition to his
comments about champerty, he pointed out that Title H is not identical
to Title VII. 24  No investigative agency or machinery for conciliation is
incorporated into Title 11; moreover, the existence of the EEOC, he
reasoned, made it unlikely that potential plaintiffs in Title VII cases
would be "discouraged. 25
The same court dealt with Title VII attorneys' fees later that year;
again, a trial court's denial of counsel fees was reversed, finding an
abuse of discretion in light of Lea.26 Newman alone was rapidly being
accepted as a sufficient criterion for the award of attorneys' fees. When
viewed from the vantage point of eight years of post-Newman decisions,
the judicial picture resembles an ever-widening circle of opinions rely-
ing, wisely or not, on the public interest rationale expressed by the
Supreme Court.
A prime example is Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,27 in which
proviso requiring plaintiff to satisfy the court of his inability to pay his attorney, 42
U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). If there is no obligation to pay, no fee should be obtained.
Apparently, however, "obligation to pay" is irrelevant to Title VII attorneys' fees except
insofar as the amount of the fee is concerned. See text accompanying notes 189-91
infra. Compare this with Houser v. Matson, 447 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1971) (FLSA case
holding that trial court abused its discretion in awarding only a nominal $1.00 fee out
of fear that counsel would receive a double fee).
21. 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 90.
23. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
24. Title II of the 1964 Act provides only for injunctive or declaratory relief, via
private actions or suits brought by the Justice Department. Since damages are not avail-
able, either expressly or through the "equitable restitution" medium, private actions are
not common.
25. 438 F.2d at 90.
26. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1972).
27. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the Fifth Circuit reversed a denial of attorneys' fees in an action under
the 1866 Civil Rights Act,2 saying: "Mhe effective remedy for securing
the rights declared in § 1982 should include the award of attorney's fees
.... "29 The 1871 Act30 was also incorporated by reference into
Newman: "Indeed, under such circumstances [when a class is
benefited], the award loses much of its discretionary character and
becomes a part of the effective remedy a court should fashion to
encourage public-minded suits and to carry out congressional policy." 31
The Fifth Circuit maintained that an allowance of attorneys' fees as
costs "is not mandatory,"3 2 despite the fact that only eight days before a
Fifth Circuit panel had reversed a lower court's denial of back pay in a
section 198 1 s case. In the earlier case the court found that "[tihere is
no relevant distinction between a section 1982 suit and a section 1981
suit such as this one," 4 and ordered, "If on remand the district court
cannot articulate specific and justifiable reasons for its denial of attor-
neys' fees, it should make a reasonable award."3 5
Not all courts hearing cases on employment discrimination in the
civil rights context have been so willing to compensate successful coun-
sel. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has been firm in section 1983
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). This provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
29. 444 F.2d at 147.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
31. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 709 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, li-
censes, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
34. Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975); Cooper v.
Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972).
35. Id. The trial court awarded $12,000 counsel fees but no back pay. Cooper
v. Allen, Civil No. 13257 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Such decisions prompted the First Circuit
to suggest that district courts make findings in all civil rights cases about the desirability
of counsel fees, Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972), a course that would
ultimately be adopted and expanded by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Hwy.
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 163-67 infra.
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cases, awarding attorneys' fees "only ... as a punitive measure where a
defendant has acted with obdurate recalcitrance."3 But the practical
significance of these decisions evaporated with the resurrection of the
1866 Civil Rights Ac 7 and the passage of the 1972 amendments to
Title VII,3 1 both of which make it unlikely that section 1983 will be
utilized to challenge employment discrimination.
36. Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 807 (N.D.
Iowa 1972), citing Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 493, 502 [sic] (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d
763, 770 (8th Cir. 1971); Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12, 16 (8th Cir. 1968); Kemp v.
Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 23 (8th Cir. 1965); and Rogers v. Paul, 345 F.2d 117, 125-26
(8th Cir.), vacated per curiam, 382 U.S. 198 (1965). But cf. Cato v. Parham, 293 F.
Supp. 1375, 1378 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968) (need for "judicial
prodding" found sufficient to justify a fee award).
Other courts have sometimes adopted similar views. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians
Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.
1968); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 375 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Smith v. City
of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1151 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 63 F.R.D. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
37. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), first applied to em-
ployment discrimination in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester
Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). See also Note, Reme-
dies-Attorney Fees Should be Awarded to a Successful Plaintiff Suing Under the Prop-
erty Rights Section of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 50 TEXAs L. REv. 204 (1971). Judge
Friendly disagrees; noting the paucity of cases proceeding solely under the 1866 act, he
mused, "one must wonder where the suitors are." H. FIENDLY, FEDERAL JuRISDICION:
A GENERAL VIEW 80 (1973).
38. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to e-15 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-6, e-8, e-9, e-13 to e-
17 (Supp. IV, 1974)). For the first time, governmental employers were brought within
Title VIrs coverage by the amendments. See Comment, Retroactivity and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 106 (1975). A claim of sov-
ereign immunity by the federal government cannot be sustained in light of the section
706(k) proviso. See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974);
Day v. Weinberger, 9 CCH EPD % 10,074 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated sub nom. Day v.
Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Justice Department has announced that
it will no longer oppose the award of fees against the United States in suits brought
under Title VII by federal employees. Asst. Atty. Gen. letter, May 6, 1975, CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRACncES GumE 1 5327. As to state governments, however, the gov-
ernmental defendant can rely upon the implications of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), which holds that the eleventh amendment prevents federal courts from
awarding damages against the state. Courts disagree on Edelman's applicability to attor-
neys' fees. See, e.g., Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Ext. Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.
1976); Jordan v. Gilligan, .500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 386 F. Supp. 179 (D. Mass. 1974) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 421
U.S. 972 (1975); Kirkland v. Department of Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975). The different facets of the
Edelman doctrine are reviewed in Leed, The Development of the Fee-Shifting Doctrine:
Attorneys' Fees for the Private Attorney General, 11 LAw NoTms 39 (1975). A three-
judge court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278, 289 (D. Conn. 1974), denied fee-
shifting saying: "While the amount sought in this case is not prohibitive, once the flood-
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No matter what the statutes say about the "prevailing party, ' 39 the
courts have looked askance at requests by successful defendants for the
award of their attorneys' fees as costs. Only a few reported decisions
have made such awards. In one case, United States v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co.,40 the government was taxed with attorneys' fees, but the
award was mooted by reversal.41 A bellwether decision is the Ninth
Circuit's approval of an award against the EEOC in Van Hoomissen v.
Xerox Corp.,42 in which the court rejected a Commission argument that
the word "costs" in section 706(k) has two separate meanings, one of
which does not include attorneys' fees.
Few employment cases have awarded attorneys' fees to a prevailing
defendant when plaintiffs were individuals or a class of individuals. The
reasoning of Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America" is typical:
Having prevailed, the defendant seeks to recover its attorney's
fees from the indigent plaintiff who proceeded in forma pauperis.
What practical purpose such an award would serve in this matter
is inscrutable, though it might conceivably serve as precedent in
terrorem to discourage other Title VII plaintiffs.
• .. The statutory language may . . .be broad enough in
terms to permit a successful defendant to recover attorney's fees,
but it is unnecessary to decide that here. In any event, the award
is discretionary with the court. The court finds that the award is
not justified here for, so far as can be determined from the record,
gates are opened, adequate control no longer prevails." The Supreme Court has now
resolved this issue by concluding that Edelman does not bar the recovery of either back
pay or attorney fees from the state in light of the congressional waiver of immunity
contained in the 1972 Amendments to Title VII. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666
(1976).
See also Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees Against a State Official Sued in His Offi-
cial Capacity After Edelman v. Jordan, 55 B.U.L. REv. 228 (1975); Comment, Federal
Powers and the Eleventh Amendment: Attorneys' Fees in Private Suits Against the
State, 63 CALiF. L. Ray. 1167 (1975); Comment, Edelman v. Jordan: The Case of the
Vanishing Retroactive Benefit and the Reappearing Defense of Sovereign Immunity, 12
HousTON L. RaV. 891 (1975); Note, Award of Attorneys' Fees Against a State Barred
by Eleventh Amendment: Jordan v. Gilligan, 29 Sw. L.J. 454 (1975); Comment, Who
Is to Guard the Guardians: Awarding Attorneys' Fees Against a State Defendant in
Public Benefit Litigation, 9 U. SAN FRANcIsco L. REv. 465 (1975).
39. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 1115 (1975), and Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 1087 (1975),
for discussions of the difficulty of determining whether a party has been "successful"
or has "prevailed."
40. 316 F. Supp. 567 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
41. 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
42. 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974). "As useful as legislative history is as an aid
to statutory construction, however, it should not be used to torture the plain meaning
of the words of the statute as finally enacted." Id. at 1133. Accord, EEOC v. Western
Elec. Co., 10 CCH EPD 1110,370 (D. Md. 1975).
43. 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the plaintiff proceeded in good faith on the advice of competent
counsel to attempt to vindicate statutory rights.
44
Richardson epitomizes the maxim that "hard cases make bad law."
Naturally an award of counsel fees against an indigent plaintiff would be
a fruitless exercise; nonetheless, there are cases in which the acts of
plaintiff or of plaintiff's counsel justify an award.
Without recognizing this distinction, other decisions echo the Rich-
ardson doctrine.45 Unaccountably, the doctrine is applied in cases
brought by the EEOC,46 and reaches its outer limits in Stambler v.
Dillon,47 a pro se action pursuant to the fifth, sixth, thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, 1986 and 1994. Although the court determined the suit to be
"unfounded," "probably maintained in bad faith," "frivolous and vexa-
tious," and to include "reckless accusations" unsupported by facts,
defendants had to bear their own costs because the litigation was "not
...so unconscionably oppressive and harassing to warrant the harsh
sanctions sought by defendants. 48  Apparently, it all depends on
whether you're pitching or catching.49
These decisions that rely on the good faith of plaintiff stand in
stark contrast to repeated statements that the good faith of defendant is
meaningless in the assessment of attorneys' fees under Title VI. ° As
44. Id. at 521-22.
45. Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Ward v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tenn. 1966). See also Haythe v. Decker
Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972) (involving 42 U.S.C. sections 1982, 3604 &
3606).
46. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975).
47. 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
48. Id. at 1257.
49. This statement is true despite the fact that Congress in 1972 expressly rejected
a proposed amendment to provide attorneys' fees to the "prevailing plaintiff." 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2166, 2174 (92d Cong., 2d Sess.). Likewise, a 1970 pro-
posal to allow costs of up to $1000 for unsuccessful plaintiffs who had brought suit in
reliance upon an EEOC probable cause determination was not enacted. See Develop-
ments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REV. 1109, 1255 n.330 (1971).
50. E.g., LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602, 611 (E.D.
La. 1971), af'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1098, 1100 (S.D. Ohio
1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972); Local 246, Utility Workers v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Richards v. Griffith Rubber
Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D. Ore. 1969). But see Jones v. New York City Human
Resources Ad., 391 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 528 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1976) (fees denied when defendants had sincerely tried to develop a "valid" test);
Twitty v. Vogue Theatre Corp., 242 F. Supp. 281 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (Title VII fees re-
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the judge in Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. put it, counsel
fees "should reflect not only an hourly compensation bit also that the
attorney's achievement in successfully prosecuting a new and difficult
case has conferred benefits upon a class of individuals exceeding those
by whom he is retained.'"51 Decisions like Rosen miss the mark.
Certainly the "common benefit" concept is a long-established exception
to the American rule, but by its very terms that concept is inapplicable
to the usual Title VII action in which an employee or class of employees
sues an employer, a labor union, or both. Under the common benefit
theory, "a successful litigant confers a 'common benefit' on an ascertain-
able group of persons and a fee award will operate to spread the
litigation costs proportionately among 'them."5-2 But under Title VII, it
is not the benefited "ascertainable group" but the employer and the
union who bear these expenses.53
Less result-oriented analyses of Title VII fee-shifting recognize that
a successful defendant should sometimes recover his costs. There has
been a recent upsurge of trial court decisions that tax plaintiffs with the
fees of defendants and that recognize the inherent unfairness of the
"6one-way street" approach. In Ash v. Hobart Manufacturing Co.," a
successful employer-defendant applied for taxation of its attorneys' fees
against plaintiffs, individual employees and the United Auto Workers
(UAW). Recognizing that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Van Hoomis-
sen55 had allowed a fee award against the EEOC and finding no express
authority for such fee-shifting as to individual plaintiffs, the court
duced by 80% when defendants in good faith had believed the Act to be unconstitu-
tional); cf. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 56 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (vic-
tory in merely establishing existence of jurisdiction not found to justify attorneys' fees).
51. 328 F. Supp. 454, 468 (D.N.J. 1971), afj'd, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); cf.
Brunwasser v. Suave, 400 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1968); Featherstone v. Barash, 382 F.2d
641 (10th Cir. 1967).
52. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 170 (1975), citing Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973), and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-
94 (1970); see text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.
53. The Title VII plaintiffs' bar strongly disagrees: "The individual, case by case
approach which has been the backbone of enforcement of federal equal employment leg-
islation is time consuming, expensive and often a frustrating experience for the victims
of discrimination." Belton, How to Settle a Discrimination Case: An Individual View-
point, PROCEEDINGS OF 28TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 111, 112 (1975). Cer-
tainly it is expensive for defendant and probably for plaintiffs' counsel, but the accuracy
of that statement, if it refers to pecuniary expense to plaintiffs, is doubtful.
54. 10 CCH EPD 10,444 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
55. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed in
text accompanying note 42 supra. For a securities fraud case taxing fees against unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs, see Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95,405 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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nonetheless expressed its belief that such an award could be made.
While employee plaintiffs were not ordered to bear the employer's
attorneys' fees because "the interest of justice would not be served" by
such an award, "the actions of plaintiff union throughout this litigation
have been such that -the Court is of the opinion that said union has been
substantially responsible for the existence of this fruitless litigation in a
manner which requires it to share with defendant the costs thereof."'
The UAW was ordered to reimburse Hobart for half of its legal expen-
ses.
Similarly, another trial court ordered an individual plaintiff (a
university professor with a comfortable income) to repay her employer's
legal fee incurred in defense of a baseless Title VII action that had
claimed both sex and race discrimination.57 The court characterized
plaintiff's testimony as "an unmitigated tissue of lies . . . motivated
solely by spleen.
58
These cases are far from commonplace; federal district judges are
less than impressed with a defendant's prayer for reimbursement when
plaintiff's claim is not utterly frivolous or malicious. 0 In most cases,
therefore, the best a Title VII defendant can hope for is to obtain a
judgment in its behalf and to absorb its own costs."' Even this result
56. 10 (XCH EPD 10,444, at 5929.
57. Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 397 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d
722 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. 397 F. Supp. at 852-53. Other recent cases approving fee-shifting from defend-
ant to plaintiff are Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D. Md. 1975)
(union defending itself against "baseless action" awarded attorneys' fees and summary
judgment, but similar prayer by employer denied); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp.,
398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975); Robinson v. KMOX-TV, 10 CCH EPD 10,512
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Mayti v. Beer Bottlers Local 187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
Contra, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
afj'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975) (no fees to employer prevailing in EEOC demand
for documents); EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 64 F.R.D. 643 (W.D. Tenn. 1974)
(awarding costs but denying fees); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 380 F. Supp.
731, 733, 734 n.2, 735 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (after characterization of efforts of plaintiff's
counsel as "utilizing the courts to establish pet theories," sending "runners" to solicit
potential plaintiffs in violation of ABA Canons 28 and 42, and using "manipulatable
statistics," the court entered judgment for defendant and taxed costs to plaintiffs, but
denied a prayer for attorneys' fees); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568, 568
(E.D.N.Y. 1934) ("Every fisherman, including novices, realizes that any one who con-
templates a fishing trip must be prepared to pay the expenses.").
59. Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1975)
("We agree with the plaintiff that an award of attorneys' fees to defendants in cases
such as this would discourage future litigation under Title VII."); Barton v. ITE Impe-
rial Corp., Civil No. C75-1682A (N.D. Ga., Jan. 26, 1976); Turner v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
60. A number of reported decisions have allowed prevailing defendants their costs,
but not attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Whitney v. W.R. Grasle Co., 3 CCII EPD q 8253
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may be difficult to attain in light of the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of
the "prevailing party" concept:
Although we find no injunction warranted here, we believe
[plaintiff's] lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the appellee
to take action implementing its own fair employment policies and
seeking compliance with the requirements of Title VII. In this
sense, [plaintiff] performed a valuable public service in bringing
this action. Having prevailed in his contentions of racial discrimi-
nation against blacks generally prior to February, 1967, [he] is
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, including services for this
appeal .... 61
This language is particularly surprising in light of the same court's
attitude in section 1983 cases.62
I. TiE CLASS ACTION PROBLEM
A complicating factor in employment discrimination cases is the
tendency for such litigation to proceed as a class action. The award of
large attorneys' fees in employee class actions has been applauded by
employees and their attorneys, and criticized by employers as a proce-
dural perversion of the judicial system.
In the words of Judge Herlands, "Study of the subject of counsel
fees in .. .derivative and other class litigation . . . [has given] rise to
a veritable literature."'6 3 In the class action context, commentators
(D. Ore. 1969), affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1971). Costs were taxed
against the Maryland Commission on Human Relations in Ferguson v. United Parcel
Serv., 270 Md. 202, 311 A.2d 220 (1973). Note the language of Woods v. North Amer-
ican Rockwell Corp., 6 CCH EPD 8792, at 5402 (N.D. Okla. 1971), a! 'd, 480 F.2d
644 (10th Cir. 1973): "Defendants, having waived recovery of their reasonable attor-
neys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-(k) [sic] shall have their costs." But see
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 6 CCH EPD T 8679 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd in
part, 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973) (although defendants prevailed, the costs were borne
equally by the parties). The court in United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
7 CCH EPD 9067 (W.D. Okla. 1973), stated that cost-splitting was a way of punish-
ing the Government, which would have received its costs had the Attorney General not
violated a court order. A detailed discussion of the costs question is found in Banks v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 7 CCH EPD 1[ 9102 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
61. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970);
accord, Fogg v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972).
Contra, Ackerman v. Board of Educ., 387 F. Supp. 76, 81-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
62. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
63. Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185, 193 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see Annot.,
38 A.L.R.3d 1384 (1971). See also 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE 23.91, at 1701-
03 (2d ed. 1975); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee
Awards, 69 HAv. L. REv. 658 (1956); 13 STAN. L. REv. 141 (1960). Two recent de-
cisions lucidly detail one court's approach to class action attorneys' fees. In Kiser v.
Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), the court set out nine criteria for assessment
of the value of an attorney's services to the class of retired coal miners suing the UMW
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make statements such as "[aittorneys' fees ought to be awarded, as a
matter of course, in all civil rights and constitutional litigation,"0 4 and
refer to attorneys' fee awards as "therapeutic."0' 5
In a study on class actions conducted at the behest of the Senate
Commerce Committee, 0 it was found that "[a]ttorneys' fees were often
substantial and accounted for the greatest reduction in the recovery
ultimately received by the class. '6 7 Out of thirty-two cases studied, fees
in twenty exceeded $100,000, and fees ranged from less than twenty-
five percent to more than fifty percent of total recovery. The study
concluded: "There is no way to assess whether attorneys were grossly
overcompensated but the question is legitimately raised when fees reach
such great amounts. '68  On the other hand, compensation of this nature
is precisely the reason that a class action may be carried on when no
individual litigation would be entertained by an attorney. D  Such cases
are, in fact, the basis for the "common benefit" exception to the Ameri-
for pension fund recovery. In the second case, Larionoff v. United States, 365 F. Supp.
140 (D.D.C. 1973), Judge Richey applied these tests again to a class of Navy petty offi-
cers seeking re-enlistment bonuses. Compare the Third Circuit's two reversals on the
ground of incomplete evidentiary presentation in Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493
F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974), appeal after remand, 515 F.2d 165, (3d Cir. 1975), with the
Tenth Circuit's denial of a fee award in Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263,
273 (10th Cir. 1975).
64. Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 33 ID. L. REv. 379, 420 (1973).
65. Indeed, Justice Harlan discussed these "corporate therapeutics" in Mills v. Elec-
tric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). See also Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics:
The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 H.Iv. L. REv. 658 (1956); Hornstein,
The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1939);
Note, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Re-
examined, 60 CALn'. L. REv. 164 (1972); Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Common Fund
Doctrine, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 236 (1974); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the
"Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public
Interest, 24 HAST. L.J 733 (1963); Note, Reimbursement for Attorneys' Fees From the
Beneficiaries of Representative Litigation, 58 MrNN. L. RaV. 933 (1974).
66. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SEs., CLAss AcrnoN
STUDY (Comm. Print 1974).
67. Id. at 29.
68. Id. at 29-30. For examples of such class action fees awards see, inter alia,
Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 515 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (Securities Act
and Securities Exchange Act; $20,500 fee vacated because counsel not given opportunity
to show adequacy of $425,000 damage settlement); and Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel
Fiber Glass Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,551 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 1976-1 Trade
Cas. If 60,843 (2d Cir. 1976) (Sherman and Clayton Acts, $325,000). Judge Friendly
has characterized some recoveries as "inordinate even in these days of high legal fees."
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JuRsISDrIToN: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
69. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 64 F.R.D. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (de-
fendant's claim that attorney-plaintiffs brought suit as class action with motive of obtain.
ing counsel fees rejected). But cf. Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del.
1974).
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can rule. 70  This situation can raise curious questions: in a class
action for damages or back pay,7 a percentage of the possible recovery
is, under normal circumstances, the goal toward which plaintiff's coun-
sel is striving. The normal understanding is embodied in a contingent
fee contract. But the award of attorneys' fees by the court, which is also
designed to encourage lawyers to accept such cases, may well be too
much of a good thing. Even advocates of a total rejection of the
American rule may find such double compensation untenable; those
who favor indemnity72 would not endorse double indemnity.
Consequently, the judicial attitude toward such contractual ar-
rangements is, at best, checkered. Some early decisions under the Fair
Labor Standards Act expressed the opinion that if the contractual fee is
in addition to that conferred by the court, the agreement is invalid,73
while others either skirted the issue,7 4 denied the additional request for
court-awarded fees,75 or concluded that the prior arrangements between
attorney and client should not influence the court's determination.
76
More recent decisions under the act seem to be inclined -toward plain-
tiffs point of view; for example, in Houser v. Matson,7 7 the Ninth
Circuit found an abuse of discretion in a trial court's one-dollar award to
plaintiffs counsel who also had a contingent fee agreement with his
client. 7 8  Comparable standards are utilized in antitrust litigation.79
70. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
71. The terms are not identical. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.., 444 F.2d 791
(4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Edwards, The Back Pay Prob-
lem in Title VII Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. REv. 781, 791 (1974); Mott,
Harnessing Class Back Pay Relief under Title Vii: A Return to the Theory of Com-
pensation, 4 CLAss AcmoN REP. 169 (Mar.-Apr. 1975).
72. See Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System,
55 IowA. L. Rsv. 26, 29 (1969), criticized in Equal Access, supra note 4, at 652.
73. Harrington v. Empire Constr. Co., 167 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1948); Burke v.
Mesta Mach. Co., 79 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
74. Skidmore v. Casale, Inc., 160 F.2d 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 812
(1947); Aucoin v. Mystic Waste Co., 55 F. Supp. 672 (D. Mass. 1944).
75. Miller v. Fox-Pelletier Int'l Detective Agency, 13 CCH Lab. Cas. 64,167
(W.D. Tenn. 1947).
76. Ivey v. Foremost Dairies, 106 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. La. 1952), modified, 204
F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1953). Contra, In re Mullendore, 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975)
(Bankruptcy Act).
77. 447 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1971).
78. The decision of the court of appeals was prompted by the fact that the trial
court had found defendant liable for a wilful violation of the Act, coupled with assur-
ances by plaintiff's attorney that any court-awarded fees would be credited against his
contractual 20% contingency. Id. at 863-64. See also International Ass'n of Machin-
ists Lodge 1194 v. Sargent Indus., 63 F.R.D. 623 (N.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d
280 (6th Cir. 1975).
79. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.
1969); Gossner v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Utah 1970);
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However, the existence of a contingent fee contract in a Title VII case is
not susceptible to the same analysis, as is exhibited by a 1974 Fifth
Circuit ruling,8 0 discussed below. 1
A strong argument can be made that, when back pay is awarded to
a class of employees, plaintiffs' lawyers should be compensated from the
fund so created. This position, borrowed from the antitrust field, 2 has
been utilized in few labor cases,83 none of which involved employment
discrimination. It is unlikely that the judiciary would accept this argu-
ment in a Title VII case, although it may have merit in a suit under the
1866 Act. It should be remembered that a Title VII attorney's fee is
Springer, Fee Awards in Antitrust Litigation, 44 ANTrrRusT L.. 97 (1975). The ability
of the class to reimburse its attorney for costs has been held to be nondiscoverable.
Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
see P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 378 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See
also Hausmann, Legal Ethics and itigation Tactics, 2 CLASS AciON RP. 3 (1973);
notes 84 & 87 infra.
80." Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. La. 1974).
81. See text accompanying notes 163-67 infra. Attempting discovery about such
contingent fee (or retainer) agreements runs head-on into the attorney-client privilege.
While plaintiffs' counsel have tried to delve into the amounts paid by defendants, see
cases cited note 79 supra, apparently no reciprocity was contemplated. Such discovery
was forbidden by writ of mandamus in Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975). Compare Ralson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973), with cases cited note 79 supra. See also United States
v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975). But the attorney-client privilege does not, "[iun
the absence of special circumstances," apply to the amount paid or owed to an attorney
by his client. United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 538 (6th Cir. 1975); Moberly
v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 345 A.2d 855 (1975).
82. United States v. ASCAP, 466 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1972); Quirke v. Chessie
Corp., 368 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radi-
ator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973); Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust
Litigation, 60 CALF. L. REv. 1656 (1972); Note, Reimbursement for Attorneyd' Fees
From the Beneficiaries of Representative Litigation, 58 MINN. L. Rnv. 933 (1974);
Comment, Attorneys-New Standard, Reflecting the Nature of Action, Applied to De-
termine Reasonable Fee Award for Class Action Attorneys, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1354
(1974). The class generally pays only to the extent it benefits. Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
424 F.2d 161, 174-75 n.16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Dillon v. Berg,
351 F. Supp. 584 (D. Del. 1972), vacated, 482 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1973). But see
Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1048 (1975).
83. Powell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1959) (contempt of
NRAB order); Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
(securing wage increase in behalf of class of employees); cf. Leisner v. New York Tel.
Co., 398 F. Supp. 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (settlement of Title VII case; fees to be paid
"from the settlement fund and not from the class members"). At least one court has
denied a fee award when the case was settled, relying on the language of section 4 of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)), which provides for fees on "judgment."
Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1967).
But in derivative actions, since the shareholders "own" the corporation, no "fund" is
needed. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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"taxed as costs" and not paid by plaintiff. Payment out of the fund
would thus diminish the recovery of each class member and that in turn
would undermine the "public policy" objectives set forth in Newman.s -
On the other hand, grave doubts have been cast upon the sound-
ness of the Newman rationale.8 5 A real barrier to utilization of a
"common benefit" procedure for spreading Title VII class action costs
over the entire class is the statutory language itself, which requires that
attorneys' fees, if awarded, be "taxed as costs." Since Title VII did not
expressly envision class actions,"6 a court must strain to award fees in
the face of the mandate of section 706(k); such straining could be
avoided if Title VII were amended to allow the awarding of attorneys'
fees, but that solution is highly improbable. Little is accomplished by
analyzing Title VII to determine what "exception" to the American rule
is embodied in section 706(k). The legislative history, which has been
consistently ignored by the courts,8 7 is of little help.
IV. CONVENTIONAL LABOR LAW MEETS NEWMAN
The National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act and
other "conventional" labor statutes do not, as a rule, permit fee-shifting.
Nonetheless, both the courts and the NLRB have, in appropriate cases,
taxed the prevailing party's fees against the losing adversary. The
"public interest" rationale for fee-shifting is present in the class action
situation; the individual complaint or grievance in the NLRA or RLA
context, in which class actions are rare, does not inspire this rationale or
leniency in the award of counsel fees for plaintiff. This has historically
84. Note, however, that in Powell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241 (3d Cir.
1959), the grant of attorneys' fees was mandated by section 3 of the Railway Labor
Act (45 U.S.C. § 153 (11 'First') (p) (1970)), which says that the petitioner shall, if he
prevails, "be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as part of
the costs of the suit." Cf. Tischler v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,538
(S.D. Fla. 1968) (granting attorneys' fees for plaintiffs in a seniority merger dispute
under section 2 of the Railway Labor Act); Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S.E. 146 (1938). But see Burlington Northern Inc. v. American
Ry. Supervisors Ass'n, 527 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1975); REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood
of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 77 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,886 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United
Transp. Union v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R.R., 59 F.R.D. 374 (D. Md. 1974). A pro
so plaintiff gets no fee award, Smith v. United Press Int'l, 8 CCH EPD 9512 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
85. See text accompanying notes 195-214 infra.
86. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Edwards,
The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L.
REv. 781, 785-87 (1974).
87. See, e.g., Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 515-16 (E.D. Va.
1968).,
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been true; however, the current judicial trend indicates an increasing
proclivity for the allowance of attorneys' fees in traditional labor cases.
A. LMRA Section 303: Strike Damages
Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 8 provides a
federal forum for the recovery of damages suffered by virtue of viola-
tions of the secondary boycott provisions of section 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act. 0 The language of section 303(b)
restricts such recovery to "the damages. . . sustained and the cost of
the suit."90  Courts have generally interpreted this as precluding the
award of either punitive damages91 or attorneys' fees.02
The major appellate decisions that have approved the award of
counsel fees as strike damages have come from the Fifth Circuit. In
H.L. Robertson & Associates, Inc. v. Plumbers Local 519,"3 the court
affirmed a damage award for the employer consisting entirely of legal
costs incurred in participation by the employer in unfair labor practice
proceedings before the NLRB and the District of Columbia Circuit.9 4
The argument of the union that attorneys' fees were "not proper ele-
ments of damage""5 was flatly rejected: "Section 303 is compensatory
in nature, and damages may be recovered only for actual losses sus-
tained as a result of the unlawful secondary activity. . . . Under the
circumstances of this case, the contention that the attorney's fees sus-
tained by Robertson are not allowable is without merit." 60  The court
cited Sheet Metal Workers Local 223 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co.07 for the
88. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
91. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Harnischfeger Corp. v.
Sheet Metal Workers Local 94, 436 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1970); UMW v. Patton, 211
F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954); Navios Corp. v. National Mari-
time Union, 236 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 359 F.2d 853
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966); cf. lodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (nominal damages). Contra, UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d
716 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960).
92. Capeletti Bros. v. Local 487, Operating Eng'rs, 514 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975);
Bryant Air Cond. & Heating Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 541, 472 F.2d 969 (8th
Cir. 1973); Local 984, Teamsters v. HumKo Co., 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 962 (1961).
93. 429 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
94. Local 519, United Ass'n of Plumbers, 171 N.L.R.B. 251 (1968), enforced as
modified, 416 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
95. 429 F.2d at 521.
96. Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
97. 384 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1967).
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proposition that attorneys' fees can be an element of damages.98 That
case said that "costs of reasonable action taken by Atlas of Jacksonville
to effect a resumption of work may be recovered."'9 9 The court also
noted: "[A]ttorneys' fees, in themselves, are not recoverable. They
are only recoverable as an element of the damages inflicted by the illegal
secondary activity. Thus, the attorneys' fees involved in prosecuting
this suit may not be recovered as they are not a loss or expense incurred
as a result of the picketing."10
Three days after Robertson, another Fifth Circuit panel decided
Abbott v. Local 142, United Associations of Pipe Fitters.101  Judge
Godbold, who had also heard the Robertson case,102 sustained without
comment a damage award that included $924.25 in counsel fees, citing
Robertson, but remanded for determination of the possibility of double
recovery. This rationale prevails in the Fifth Circuit0 3 and has found
scattered acceptance in other circuits.'0 4
B. Section 301 Actions: Breach of Contractual Duties
Actions pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA 0 5 generally fall
into three categories: breach of a collective bargaining agreement,
98. It also cited Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. IBEW Local 480, 428 F.2d 121
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970), but that case makes no reference to attor-
neys' fees. Perhaps the intended citation was Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-
cil v. F.R. Hoar & Son, Inc., 370 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1967), which does allow recovery
of attorneys' fees.
99. 384 F.2d at 110.
100. Id. at 110 n.10. See also Construction Laborers Local 438 v. Hardy Eng'r &
Constr. Co., 354 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1965); Aircraft Maint. Employees Local 290 v. I.E.
Schilling Co., 340 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 972 (1966); Local
984, Teamsters v. HumKo Co., 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962
(1961).
101. 429 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. Robertson was considered without oral argument, pursuant to 5T Cu R. 18.
429 F.2d at 521 n.1.
103. Refrigeration Contractors, Inc. v. Local 211, United Ass'n of Plumbers, 501
F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1974); see Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 316 F. Supp.
509 (N.D. Ala.), affd, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963
(1971); American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United Ass'n of Plumbers Local 714, 304
F. Supp. 1144 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
104. Mason-Rust v. Laborers' Local 42, 435 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1970); Plumbers
Local 761 v. Matt J. Zaich Constr. Co., 418 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1969); contra, Sillman
v. Teamsters Local 386, 78 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,428 (9th Cir. 1976).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). This provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
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failure to comply with an arbitration award, and breach of the duty of
fair representation. An action for breach of contract under section 301
is similar to a section 303 case: both stem from claimed violation of
section 7 rights. Since there is no language in the statute concerning
costs or fees, the courts are forced to use the language of punitive
damages, "arbitrary or capricious action"'10 or "bad faith"'107 to justify
an award. The impact of Newman is felt, however, in opinions such as
Butler Manufacturing: 8 "[A]n award of attorneys' fees . . . is justi-
fied as compensatory, rather than punitive . . . [and] constitutes an
appropriate item of damage to be awarded by the courts in the enforce-
ment of national labor policy."'0 9
In section 301 actions that seek to compel compliance with arbitra-
tors' awards, the grant of counsel fees is discretionary. 110 Thus, doubts
about the meaning of recent court decisions,"' split decisions by the
arbitrator or the court,"' or the question of "justification" for failure to
comply1' 3 are often dispositive; conversely, arguable inconsistency of an
106. New Park Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 4264, 283 F.2d 225 (8th
Cir. 1961) (suit to compel checkoff); Sheeder v. Eastern Express, Inc., 375 F. Supp.
655 (W.D. Pa. 1974); United Papermakers v. Penntech Papers Co., 360 F. Supp. 236
(W.D. Pa. 1973); Worcester Stamped Metal Co. v. United Steelworkers, 234 F. Supp.
823 (D. Mass. 1964) (denied to both parties).
107. International Union of Elec. Workers v. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 489
F.2d 768 (1st Cir. 1973); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425
F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1971); Local 494, IBEW v. Art-
kraft, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp,
191 (D. Conn. 1974).
108. United Steelworkers v. Butler Mfg. Co., 439 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1971).
109. Id. at 1112-13. See also Local 494, IBEW v. Artkraft, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 129
(E.D. Wis. 1974); cf. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 1194 v. Sargent Indus.,
522 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1975); A.H. Belo Corp. v. Dallas Typographical Union, 82
L.R.R.M. 2574 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Retail Clerks v. Employers Committee, 81 L.R.R.M.
2671 (D. Ore. 1972).
110. Nashville Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing
Corp., 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975); Local 4, IBEW v. Radio Thirteen-Eighty, Inc.,
469 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1972); Local 369, Bakery Workers v. Cotton Baking Co., 377
F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 514 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
filed (No. 75-690); Communications Workers v. Arkansas W. Gas Co., 329 F. Supp.
896 (W.D. Ark. 1971); United Cement Workers Local 84 v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
216 F. Supp. 667, 669 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ("not provided for under § 301"); United Fur-
niture Workers v. Fort Smith Couch & Bedding Co., 214 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Ark.
1963).
111. Bangor and Aroostook R.R. v. BLF&E, 442 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Local
149, UAW v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
873 (1962); UAW v. Buhr Mach. Tool Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
112. Dallas Typographical Union, No. 173 v. A.H. Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1967).
113. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 917 v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 341
F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1972); International Union of Dist. 50, UMW v. James Julian,
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arbitrator's order and findings will not compel reversal of the grant of
attorneys' fees.114 The appellate decisions afford greater deference to
the equitable discretion of the trial judge under section 301 than under
the expressly discretionary provisions of Title VII. Additionally, the
courts will not exercise pendent jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees
under state law. 15
Attorneys' fees are often awarded in class actions for breach of the
duty of fair representation under section 301, although individual ac-
tions are unable to invoke the common benefit theory or inspire cred-
ence by the courts."" If an individual action for unfair representation
is based upon some discriminatory classification, the "common benefit"
theory is applicable and attorneys' fees may be recovered. 1 7 When a
group of employees will benefit from the relief obtained, and the recov-
ery is "substantial," plaintiffs' attorneys may be entitled to payment
from that recovery upon equitable principles.
C. LMRDA Section 102: Union Members' Rights
Section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA)"18 provides a civil remedy to employees for union
infringements of employee rights. Judicial attitudes toward such litiga-
tion have seen the same sort of metamorphosis as in the section 303
area,"19 changing from the rejection of fee-shifting120 to the grant of
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 503 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Parker v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
114. International Union of Dist. 50, UMW v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 421 F.2d 934
(5th Cir. 1970). In Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1976), it was stated that an injunction bond could include
reasonable attorneys' fees.
115. Cf. McBride v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
116. William H. Lee Co. v. New Haven Printing Pressmen Local 74, 255 F. Supp.
929 (D. Conn. 1966).
117. Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040
(1968); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Local 4076,
Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 338 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Blankenship
v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1972); Burch v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
78 L.R.R.M. 2444 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Local 648, Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). This Act guarantees individual union members'
rights to equal treatment, freedom of speech and assembly, fair dues and assessments,
access to the courts and administrative agencies without fear of retaliation, and due proc-
ess in intra-union disciplinary proceedings.
119. See text accompanying notes 88-104 supra.
120. MeCraw v. United Ass'n of Plumbers Local 43, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965);
Jacques v. Local 1418, ILA, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965); Magelssen v. Local 518,
Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965); Leonard v. M.I.T. Employees' Union,
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attorneys' fees "in appropriate cases."' 21  In Hall v. Cole,'22 the Su-
preme Court examined the propriety of an attorney's fee award under
section 102 of the LMRDA.123  After the standard prefatory statement
that the American rule disfavors the granting of attorneys' fees to the
successful party, the Court catalogued the exceptions to that rule: the
court may award counsel fees when the adverse party acted "in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,' 24 or when the
litigation results in "substantial benefit on the members of an ascertain-
able class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs
proportionately among them.' 25  The Court specifically declined to
consider whether Mills and Newman compelled the award of attorneys'
fees via the "private attorney general" rationale; 2 6 however, the Court
225 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964); Cutler v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 231 F. Supp.
845 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affl'd per curiam, 366 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 993. (1967); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943 (D.
Conn.), afrd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
121. Morrissey v. Segal, 526 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1975); Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d
348 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968); Schmidt v. McCarthy, 369 F.2d
176 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Bakery Workers v. Ratner, 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964), ap-
peal after remand, 354 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2
(2d Cir. 1962); Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Cox v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 398 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Hammond v.
Housing Auth., 328 F. Supp. 586 (D. Ore. 1971); Koonce v. Gaier, 320 F. Supp. 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Highway Truck
Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 215 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Pa. 1963), afj'd, 334 F.2d 378
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 921 (1964); Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v.
Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.), a! 'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961); cf. Brennan v. Connecticut State UAW CAP, 60 F.R.D. 626 (D.
Conn. 1974). Such cases are ably discussed in Comment, Attorney's Fees Under the
Landrum-Griffin Act: The Need for "Union Therapeutics," 7 LoYoLA OF L.A.L. Rav.
137 (1974), which opines that "such awards must be made mandatory in every success.
ful suit." Id. at 161.
122. 412 U.S. 1 (1973), opinion on remand, 376 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
123. See Comment, Title I of the LMRDA: Rights and Remedies of Union Mem-
bers with Respect to Their Unions, 11 Wxu.LAMEnE L.J. 258 (1975); Comment, Coun-
sel Fees For Union Officers Under the Fiduciary Provision of Landrum-Griffin, 73
YA.E L.J. 443 (1964).
124. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per
curiam); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Bell v. School Bd., 321
F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481
(4th Cir. 1951); 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrxc ji 54.77[21, at 1703 (2d ed. 1976).
A striking example is found in Tiidee Prods., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 705 (1969); see text
accompanying notes 138-52 infra. Compare Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB,
476 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 1 (1974), with AFTRA v. Taft
Broadcasting Co., 368 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
125. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967); Trustees v. Green-
ough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
126. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.7. Another court has analyzed the exceptions
to the general rule as threefold: "obdurate behavior," "common fund," and "private at-
19761 LABOR RELATIONS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 1183
quoted with approval the Second Circuit's statement that "'[w]ithout
counsel fees the grant of federal jurisdiction is but a gesture for few
union members could avail themselves of it.' "127 As commentators
have pointed out,1 28 the fiduciary obligations of section 501(a) 1'2 9 in
herent in Landrum-Griffin proceedings make attorneys' fees especially
appropriate in LMRDA cases.' 80
D. Pension Plans and Arbitration
Other labor statutes have occasionally been used as vehicles for
attorneys' fees requests. The award of fees for plaintiff's counsel is
usually not deemed appropriate in actions under section 302 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act,"81 which have been labelled "fund-
producing."' 3 2  However, if the requirements of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (Pension Reform Act)3  are met, a statutory
assessment of fees may be allowed. 34  In the arbitration area, at least
torney general," while stating that the Mills and Yablonski decisions defy categorization.
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). A thorough review can be
found in Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th
Cir. 1973), vacated, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
127. 412 U.S. at 13, quoting Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1972).
128. See, e.g., Comment, Labor Law-Mandatory Attorney's Fees--Section 102,
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act-Hall v. Cole, 51 DENVER L.J. 169
(1974); Comment, Attorney's Fees Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: The Need for
"Union Therapeutics," 7 LOYOLA OF L.A.L. REV. 137 (1974); Comment, The Changing
American Rule Against Attorney Fee Shifting: Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. and Hall
v. Cole, 28 Sw. LI. 542 (1974).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1970).
130. Recent LMRDA decisions contain excellent analyses of the Hall v. Cole ra-
tionale. See, e.g., McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1976); Kerr v. Screen
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975); Cox v. International Alliance of The-
atrical Employees, 398 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1975). A further extension of fee-shift-
ing is Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), which awards attorneys'
fees to plaintiffs even in the absence of bad faith or common benefit. But in Signal
Deliv. Serv., Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107, 68 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
fees were denied on all portions of a section 102 suit except those concerning contempt
-a traditional "bad faith" example.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
132. Snider v. All State Adm'rs, Inc., 481 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 957 (1974); Cutler v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 231 F. Supp. 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), afj'd per curiam, 366 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
993 (1967). But see Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971), opinion on remand, 362 F. Supp. 747 (M.D. Pa.
1973).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-144 (Supp. IV, 1974). This Act substantially incorpo-
rates the former Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (formerly codified at sec-
tions 301 et seq. of 29 U.S.C.). The present Act, like its predecessor, requires willful
violation as a condition precedent to recovery for nondisclosure or misuse of covered
employee benefit plans. Id. § 1131.
134. Id. § 1132(g), discussed in Comment, The New Federal Pension Reform Act,
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two cases have dealt with attorneys' fees, with conflicting results: in
Montgomery County Community Action Agency' 35 counsel fees were
denied to the grievant, but in Sunshine Convalescent Hospital'8 an ex
parte award ordered reimbursement of the union attorney's fee when the
employer's defense was "known. . .to be without merit."'
8 7
E. Attorneys' Fees and the NLRB: The Tiidee Products Case
The history of the Tiidee Products litigation reveals the extreme
reluctance of the courts to engraft a variant of the British rule upon
"conventional" labor relations. Tiidee, a manufacturer of parts for
mobile homes and trailers, refused to bargain with the Electrical Work-
ers (IUE). The NLRB entered an order to compel Tiidee to bar-
gain,' 1 8 whereupon the union sought and obtained judicial endorsement
of the Board's power to order reimbursement of the union's legal
expenses (Tiidee 1)." 9  On remand, not only was IUE awarded its
legal fees, but also the Board's attorneys' fees were to 'be reimbursed.
40
Tiidee again refused to bargain, and the Board again declined to
tax legal costs.' 4 ' The District of Columbia Circuit, in Tiidee JJ,142
remanded for reconsideration in light of Tiidee I, whereupon the NLRB
found the second refusal to bargain frivolous and intertwined with the
4 CLASS ACTION R P. 45 (1975). See generally Redman v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766
(1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517
F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Mumford v. Glover, 503 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974); Kiser
v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974), opinion on reh'g sub non. Pete v. UMW
Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, supra; Harrold v. Coble, 380 F.2d 18 (4th Cir.
1967); Porter v. Teamsters Health, Welfare & Life Ins. Funds, 321 F. Supp. 101 (E.D.
Pa. 1970).
Another possible area of attorneys' fees confrontation is presented by section 11 (c)
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970), allow-
ing an employee who alleges discharge or discrimination for assisting the Department
of Labor to file suit for "all appropriate relief." Id. § 660(c) (2). Similar provisions
are found in the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b) (3) (1970);
id. § 938(c) (Supp. IV, 1974), but not in the Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,
30 U.S.C. §§ 721-40 (1970). See O'Reilly, Job-Related' Discrimination and Discharge
Under the Federal Safety Statutes, 24 LAB. L.J. 718 (1973).
135. 62 Lab. Arb. 1278 (1974).
136. 62 Lab. Arb. 276 (1974).
137. Id. at 279. The employer failed to appear at the arbitration hearing.
138. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 705 (1969).
139. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970) (Tildee I).
140. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972).
141. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 969 (1969).
142. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (per curiam) (Tiidee II).
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previous unfair labor practice. Again Tiidee was ordered to bear the
legal expenses of both the Board and the IUE.
143
Meanwhile, the District of Columbia Circuit had been faced with
another case involving similar remedial issues. A month after Tiidee I,
the court had rendered a per curiam order sending the case of Heck's,
Inc., a retail discount chain in its ninth round of unfair labor practice
charges,'" back to the Board for proceedings consistent with Tiidee
1.145 When Heck's again came before the court in 1972, attorneys' fees
incurred by both the union and the NLRB were taxed to Heck's along
with the union's "excess" organizational expenditures.' 46
When Tildee I again reached the court, this time on review of the
Board's fees award, it was decided that although Tiidee's conduct had
been "brazen" and "frivolous," since this case had been the employer's
first bout with Board procedures, 14 7 Tiidee, as a "stranger" to NLRB
mandates, was entitled to the status of a first offender. Consequently,
only a portion of the union's attorneys' fees, and none of the Board's,
were to be taxed to the employer.
The next month, the Supreme Court viewed the Tiidee I rule
as a mid-game switch and ordered that the Heck's reimbursement
order be returned to the NLRB to enable the Board, rather than the
courts, to determine whether Tiidee I would be applied retroactively.' 48
A unanimous Court found that the court of appeals improperly exercised
the authority granted by sections 10(e) and 10(f) of the National
Labor Relations Act.' 49  Even though comparison of the Board's orders
for Heck's and Tiidee revealed "factual inconsistencies," the Court felt
the Board should be given a shot at making a "plausible reconciliation"
of the apparently diametrical resolutions of the two cases. 5 ' The
Board has not yet resolved the conflict. 5'
143. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 158 (1972).
144. See Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 541, 543 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 543.
146. Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
147. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
148. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Local 347, 417 U.S. 1 (1974).
149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e)-(f) (1970).
150. 417 U.S. at 9. Certiorari was denied in other litigation involving Tiidee Prod-
ucts. Tiidee Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Tiidee Prods., Inc. v. NLRB,
417 U.S. 921 (1974).
151. See NLRB v. Local 396, Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). See generally Comment, NLRB Attorneys' Fees
Awards: An Inadequate Remedy for Refusal to Bargain, 63 GEo. L.J. 955 (1975).
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State courts have also been reluctant to embrace the British
rule: the Supreme Court of Hawaii has denied a fee award in a suit
brought by a female supervisor to gain entry into a union, predicating
the denial upon a lack of "issues of general significance.'
2
V. How MucH DoEs IT COST?
The criteria for determining adequacy of a court-awarded attor-
ney's fee are exhaustive but not enlightening. The only sure index for
the trial court is whether the award is sustained or reversed on appeal.
Although the Supreme Court has found that fee schedules consti-
tute illegal price-fixing, 5 3 such lists historically have received great
deference from the judiciary in assessing counsel fees as costsY 4 A
court, however, has always been entitled through its equity powers to
consider factors other than strict per-hour compensation. The neces-
sary considerations for the trial court to take into account were recited in
one opinion:
They include the intricacy of the case and the difficulty of proof,
the time reasonably expended in the preparation and trial of the
case, the degree of competence displayed by the attorneys seeking
compensation and the measure of success achieved by these attor-
neys. In public interest cases, courts also should consider the
benefit inuring to the public, the personal hardships that bringing
this kind of litigation cause plaintiffs and their lawyers, and the
added responsibility of representing a class rather than only individ-
ual plaintiffs.155
Other factors include the attorneys' loss of opportunity for other employ-
ment,'56 the financial status of the defendant, l5 and the lawyers' over-
152. Salvador v. Popaa, 530 P.2d 7, 8 (Haw. 1974).
153. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), rev'g 497 F.2d 1 (4th
Cir. 1974).
154. See, e.g., King v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 927 (5th Cir. 1973). At
least one decision has reduced the fee demand to reflect the fee rate at the time the
services were rendered. Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 378 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Il.
1974). After Goldfarb, these decisions are of doubtful value as precedent.
155. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972). One court has
held that the amount of recovery, when counsel is expert in that area of the law, is more
important than the time spent. Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). But a higher court insists that time records are 'the only legitimate
starting point." City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
Note also that the Supreme Court has held that the issue of the amount of attorneys'
fees is a jury question. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam).
156. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 120 Ct. CI. 609 (1951).
157. Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
As one court stated in a section 1981-Title II case, 'The purpose of the law is to accom-
plish 'Equal Rights under the Law' to 'all persons.' It is not to put any one out of busi-
ness." Black v. Bonds, 308 F. Supp. 774, 776 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
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head expenses.' 58 Inventive attorneys keep coming up with new items
for possible reimbursement. A demand for compensation of paralegal
personnel in Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp.159 result-
ed in the denial of such an award, "although the portion of such
paraprofessionals' salary relating to the case may be recovered as an out-
of-pocket expense."'160 Since such matters are already figured as over-
head 'by most firms, secretaries' salaries, office rental space and the like
should not be recovered as an out-of-pocket expense.
A more thorough compilation of criteria can be found through
study of attorneys' compensation claims in non-labor contents, particu-
larly in the divorce and bankruptcy fields.' 6 ' The ABA's Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility has been used as a standard for the proper mea-
sure of legal fees in these contexts.'6 2
The Fifth Circuit's recent opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 63 enumerated twelve considerations upon which trial
courts should make specific findings in an award of Title VII attorneys'
fees: (1) time and labor required, (2) novelty and difficulty of
questions, (3) requisite skill, (4) preclusion of other employment by
the attorney, (5) customary fee, (6) fixed or contingent fee, (7) time
limitations, (8) amount involved and results obtained, (9) attorney
reputation, (10) "undesirability" of case, (11) length and nature of
professional relationship with client, and (12) awards in similar
cases.' 64 The court expressly refused to criticize the amount ($1350) of
the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel. The prob-
lem was that the trial judge did not enumerate all the criteria that the
Fifth Circuit deemed to be important. Lest the court give the wrong
impression, Judge Roney stated:
To put these guidelines into perspective and as a caveat to
their application, courts must remember that they do not have a
mandate under Section 706(k) to make the prevailing counsel
rich. Concomitantly, the Section should not be implemented in a
manner to make the private attorney general's position so lucrative
158. Hammer v. Tuffy, 145 F.2d 447, 451 (2d Cir. 1944).
159. 1975-2 Trade Cas. 1 60,551 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd and appeal from award
of attorneys" fees dismissed as moot, 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1976).
160. Id. at 67,413.
161. See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 13 (1957); Annot., 143 A.L.R. 672 (1943).
162. ABA CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSmmrrY DR 2-106, cited in Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711-12 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 437 F.2d 959
(5th Cir. 1971).
163. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
164. Id. at 717-19.
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as to ridicule the public attorney general. The statute was not
passed for the benefit of attorneys but to enable litigants to obtain
competent counsel worthy of a contest with the caliber of counsel
available to their opposition and to fairly place the economical
burden of Title VII litigation. Adequate compensation is neces-
sary, however, to enable an attorney to serve his client effectively
and to preserve the integrity and independence of the profession.
The guidelines contained herein are merely an attempt to assist in
this balancing process.16 5
In further explaining the import of Johnson, Judge Griffin Bell has
stated: "If you're a 'private attorney general,' you have to think about
what the public Attorney General gets paid."'
6 6
Decisions like Johnson have resulted in increasing demands that
trial courts justify their fee assessments or the lack of a fee award. 10 7 In
some close cases, the trial courts have responded with percentage recov-
eries. A Title VII action in point is Gunn v. Layne & Bowler, Inc.,'08 in
which defendant prevailed on three of five counts; the trial judge
found: ". . [Tihe Court adopts the principle that the fee may be based
upon that portion of the case in which the plaintiff and those in his class
prevailed."' 69 Similarly, the court in Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. 170 reduced the award of fees to deny compensation for efforts that
were not successful, ignoring an argument that the action "had a certain
prophylactic effect.' 171  Slightly different standards may apply on ap-
peal, however; in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., the court denied
plaintiff-appellants their costs of challenging the adequacy of the fee
awarded by the trial court but allowed fees for the defense of the
award.
172
165. Id. at 719-20.
166. BNA LABOR RELATIONS Y-A BooK-1974, at 147 (1975) (emphasis added).
Judge Bell has since returned to private practice.
167. E.g., Evans v. Seaman, 496 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1974) (Title VII case; re-
manded for consideration in light of 1ohnson, with "no intimation" of whether $1750
fee award was acceptable). See also Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
168. 1 CCH EPD 9823 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
169. Id. at 885; see Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1008
(9th Cir. 1972); cf. Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 172 F. Supp.
960, 961 (D. Mass. 1959) (costs).
170. 6 CCH EPD If 8693 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
171. Id. at 5086. Judge McFadden also observed, "In this case, the time involved
is next to useless even as a factor because of the mixture of successful and unsuccessful
efforts." Id. at 5087. See also Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th
Cir. 1974).
172. 442 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 251 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1966). But see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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Vesting such broad discretion in the trial court has produced some
peculiar results. In Wilder v. Isenberg,' the court awarded a fee
based on a scale of fifty dollars per hour, without differentiating be-
tween time spent by partners and that of associates. In Blank v. Talley
Industries, Inc.,'74 however, claimed fees of $3,055,000 were halved
because, among other reasons; partners had performed work that "could
have been performed by junior associates." Even the time required of
the judge's law clerk175 and the precarious financial condition of defend-
antWro have been utilized to reduce the award.
On the other hand, at least two courts have conferred "bonuses" on
plaintiff's counsel,17 7 and another has allowed counsel to take the un-
claimed portion of a settlement fund. 78 Requests for interim fees,
while generally disallowed, 79 have been favorably received in some
instances. 80  Seven-figure fees awards have become commonplace in
securities and antitrust litigation, 81 and awards have reached six figures
in employment practices cases.'82
Courts have also considered the "substandard financial status of
the aggrieved party,"1 83 while "public interest" attorneys have argued
When the trial court feels that the initial fee award was adequate, there is Fair
Labor Standards Act precedent for denial of additional fees for appellate proceedings.
See, e.g., Martin Nebraska Co. v. Culkin, 197 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1952); United States
Steel Co. v. Burkett, 192 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1951); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v.
Keen, 157 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1946). For other discussion of this issue see Ellis v. Fly-
ing Tiger Corp., 504 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1972); Cole v. Hall, 376 F. Supp. 460
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
173. CCH FaD. SEC. L. REP. 94,818 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
174. 390 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
175. Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 152 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
176. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (1975).
177. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 CCH EPD 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (Title
VII); Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (anti-
trust case awarding four times the requested hourly rate (thus up to $500 per hour) for
services of twenty attorneys).
178. Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,366
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
179. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 56 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
180. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 9 CCH EPD 10,039 (E.D. Va. 1974),
aff'd in part & remanded in part, 11 CCH EPD 10,728 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. SEC v.
Trio Sec., Inc., 1974-1975 CCII F D. Sm. L. REP. If 94,777 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Mazur
v. Behrens, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,213 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
181. In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ($9,262,559; plain-
tiffs' counsel had requested more than $21,000,000); Levin v. Mississippi River Corp.,
377 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd mem., 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1974) ($2,-
600,000); Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 597 (D. Colo. 1974) (cash and
stock worth $3,780,000).
182. Boles v. Union Camp Corp., Civil No. 2804 (S.D. Ga. 1975) ($101,500).
183. Snelling v. O.K. Serv. Garage, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 842, 847 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
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that plaintiff's attorney's compensation should be measured by the
amount expended by defendant in resisting the claim.18 4  But such
arguments are difficult to support. As one commentator noted,
Why should the private defendant bear a greater potential liability
toward a poorer or less well organized plaintiff than toward one
who is able to finance litigation on his own? This seems to create
something of a double standard, particularly where the attorney's
fee award exceeds the other monetary relief.'85
Similarly, contentions of this type ignore the reality that monetarily
insignificant claims may be contested because unfavorable disposition of
the issue would engender a flood of coattail litigation.' 86
It also seems unfair to saddle defendant with double liability for
attorneys' fees in a situation in which plaintiff does not prevail. Al-
though it has been held that a party does not prevail when the court
refuses relief,187 expansion of fee awards under Newman has resulted in
a trend toward awarding fees to a plaintiff who does not prevail on the
theory that "pro bono publico" litigation should be encouraged. 188 And
although one court denied attorneys' fees when plaintiffs "incurred no
obligation to pay,"18 9 and other courts have reduced the amount of
attorneys' fees because of NAACP or Department of Justice participa-
tion, 90 the majority of courts ignore the fee obligation or the amount of
non-compensated services rendered, since the "prevailing party" rather
than his attorneys receives the reimbursement.'
184. See, e.g., Kohn, Symposium on Class Actions: Panel Discussion, 41 AN7-
TRusT L.J. 321, 345-46 (1972); Moore, The Potential Function of the Modern Class Suit,
2 CLAss ACTION REP. 47, 55 (1973).
185. Equal Access, supra note 4, at 672 n.219, citing Advance Business Sys. & Sup-
ply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 55 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
186. "It must be remembered . . . that not all small claims are clearly meritorious.
." Equal Access, supra note 4, at 651.
187. Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 455 F.2d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
Clanton v. Allied Chem. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Va. 1976) (court expresses
inability to determine who "prevailed" in consent decree).
188. McEntaggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943
(1971). But see Thomas v. J.C. Penney Co., 531 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g 9
CCH EPD 10,130 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Colorado PIRG, Inc. v. Train, 373 F. Supp.
991 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 998
(1975). See generally Comment, Balancing the Equities in Attorney's Fees Awards:
Losing Plaintiffs and Private Defendants, 62 Gao. L.J. 1439 (1974).
189. Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Miss. 1965) (Title II).
190. See, e.g., Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf., 166 F.
Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd on other
ground, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
191. See, e.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Ameri-
can Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), affd per curiam, 437 F.2d 959
1190 [Vol. 54
1976] LABOR RELATIONS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 1191
VI. ALYESKA PIPELINE: Is THE GOLD RUSH EN DING?
Until recently the "private attorney general" rationale was the
accepted basis for fee-shifting. But the juridical basis -for this argument
abruptly disappeared when the Supreme Court, on May 12, 1975,
rendered its 5-2192 decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society. 93 In an opinion that reviews the development of the
American rule and its exceptions, the Court reversed the District of
Columbia Circuit's allowance of attorney fees to the Wilderness Society
as "private attorneys general" for the Society's challenge to construction
of the Alaska pipeline. This decision dealt a severe blow to the public
interest bar in cases not governed by express statutory authorization to
shift fees.
194
The Court of Appeals had based its fee award on the idea that the
Society had been pursuing "important statutory rights of all citizens."'195
Thus, a fee award against Alyeska 96 was deemed appropriate, "lest the
great cost of litigation of this kind, particularly against well-financed
defendants such as Alyeska, deter private parties desiring to see the laws
protecting the environment properly enforced.' 97
The Supreme Court majority, however, ruled that "it would be
inappropriate for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallo-
cate the burdens of litigation in the manner and to the extent urged by
respondents and approved by the Court of Appeals."' 98  The Newman
rationale was described as limited to cases in which fee-shifting is
authorized by statute. 199 Three accepted nonstatutory, noncontractual
exceptions to the American rule were recognized: the "'common bene-
fit'" exception, 00 "'willful disobedience of a court order,' "201 and
(5th Cir. 1971); but see, Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., 12 CCH EPD 1 10,993 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
192. Mr. Justice White spoke for Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Black-
mun and Rehnquist. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, while Justices Douglas
and Powell did not participate.
193. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
194. Id. at 241, rev'g Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
195. 495 F.2d at 1032.
196. A fee award against the United States was denied on the basis of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1970), see id. at 1036. Taxation of fees against the State of Alaska was also
deemed inappropriate, id. at 1036 n.8.
197. 421 U.S. at 245.46. The quotation is Mr. Justice White's interpretation of the
court of appeals' decision.
198. Id. at 247.
199. Id. at 262.
200. Id. at 245; see text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
201. 421 U.S. at 258, quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp., V. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
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instances "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . "202 In instances other than
statutory authorization, the three stated nonstatutory exceptions, or ex-
press contractual provision, 03 Alyeska Pipeline censures court-fashioned
grants of attorneys' fees.
One of the most curious references in the majority opinion directly
concerns employment-related litigation. In discussing the hazards of
making inroads into the American rule, the question is posed, "if any
statutory policy is deemed so important that its enforcement must be
encouraged by awards of attorneys' fees, how could a court deny attor-
neys' fees -to private litigants in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking
to vindicate constitutional rights? '20 4 As previously noted,205 this ques-
tion has been asked and answered in a far different manner in a host of
section 1983 cases,20 8 and Mr. Justice White's reference to the practice
as an outrageous example constitutes amazement at the commonplace.
"Moreover," the majority asks, "should courts, if they were to
embark on the course urged by respondents, opt for awards to the
prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, or only to the prevailing
plaintiff?" 207 Iti a footnote, the Court observes that while some legisla-
tion restricts recovery to prevailing plaintiffs, Title VII contains no such
limitation. 20 The Court seems to ignore the lower courts' de facto
restriction of fee awards to only plaintiffs.
Hence, while purporting to retain the validity of the Newman rule,
Alyeska imposes significant limitations upon the private attorney general
rationale. 20 9  However, restriction of fee awards to circumstances in
202. 421 U.S. at 258-59, quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial
Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
203. The opinion identifies thirty federal statutes that permit fee-shifting by explicit
congressional grant, including FED. R. Civ. P. 37, and notes the breadth of sanctions
available against frivolous litigation instituted by legal aid offices. 421 U.S. at 260-62
nn.33, 35, 36.
204. 421 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original).
205. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra. See also Carter v. Noble, 526 P.2d
677 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
206. See Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975); cases cited notes
30-36 supra.
207. 421 U.S. at 264.
208. Id. at 264 n.37.
209. The majority noted, "In recent years, some lower federal courts, erroneously,
we think, have employed the private-attorney-general approach to award attorneys' fees."
421 U.S. at 270 n.46. The disapproved cases include decisions from nearly every circuit.
Nonetheless, only days after Alyeska the Eighth Circuit adopted what appears to be a
new standard of "bad faith" in circumvention of the proscriptive language of Alyeska.
Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975). It has been recommended that statutes
expressly provide for fee-shifting, see ABA/American Assembly, Law in a Changing So-
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which there is an express statutory grant leaves a vast amount of fee-
shifting in force. In. 1974 alone, many statutes allowing recovery of
attorneys' fees were enacted. 210  The effect of the adoption of criteria
such as in Johnson can be to punish defendant for a good defense or a
bad one; for the fact that plaintiffs counsel is skilled, or that he is not;
for the novelty of questions presented; or for the apparent nature of the
ultimate result. Actual evidence of the reasonable value of counsel's
services is not required. 211
Sweeping departures from the general rule have prompted critics to
conclude that the rule should be officially interred.212 One commenta-
tor has advocated the broadening of the class action rule to provide
attorneys' fees if plaintiff prevails in order to fund public-interest
suits. 213 The plaintiffs' attorneys' magazine, Trial, has hailed the "ex-
plicit authorization of counsel fee allowances" under Title VII as a boon
to the profession in the wake of the "sharp loss of business" occasioned
by no-fault insurance. 14 If the general rule is formally abandoned,
however, its replacement should not be a one-way street,215 a subsidy for
plaintiffs' attorneys. A policy that supports a statutory grant of attor-
neys' fees to a prevailing party should apply equally to plaintiffs and
defendants: a bad faith complaint as well as a bad faith defense may
justify fee-shifting; conversely, good faith should constitute a defense to
a claim for attorneys' fees.
A clear recognition of this principle is expressed in Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc.2 1. After evaluating the
Newman test, the trial court concluded: "When damages are awarded
ciety, 61 A.B.A.J. 931, 933 (1975). A number of such bills are now pending. See, e.g.,
S. 2530, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (to cover all civil litigation against U.S. govern-
mental agencies); S. 2715, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (administrative agency proceed-
ings); H.R. 8219, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (injunctive relief under Clayton Act).
210. E.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Act of Sept. 2,
1974, Pub. L No. 93-406, § 502(g), 88 Stat 891 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1142 (Supp.
IV, 1974)).
211. Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970) (no expert testi-
mony required); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Reid, 168 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1948).
Contra, Hayes v. Bill Haley & His Comets, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
212. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 202 (1966).
213. J. GOULDEN, THE SuPERLAWYERS 380 (paper ed. 1972).
214. Cooper & Rosenthal, Equal Employment Opportunity ...New Legal Field,
8 TRAIU., Jan./Feb. 1972, at 47.
215. One court has found that a statutory allowance of fees only to plaintiffs is vio-
lative of equal protection. Gaster v. Coldiron, 297 A.2d 384 (Del. 1972) (mechanic's
lien).
216. 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
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... the need for recovery of attorney fees is decreased significantly ....
[W]here no economic burden exists or where the nature of the burden
is such that no relief is obtained by an award of attorney fees, this
Court sees no useful purpose in making such an award. 217
The court criticized the Fifth Circuit for the rule set forth in Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.218 as "not giv[ing] sufficient weight" to
the Newman decision's logical implications: non-frivolous good faith
defenses are "special circumstances" that could well justify a denial of
plaintiff's demand for attorneys' fees.219 Certainly a rule awarding
attorneys' fees only when the opposing party acted in bad faith would
not be inconsistent with a positive view of litigation. Any other result
has the effect of casting a defendant into Ambrose Bierce's classic defi-
nition of a litigant: "A person about to give up his skin for the hope of
retaining his bones." The very least the legal process should provide is
an equal opportunity for assertion of the defense of good faith.
In summary, equitable considerations dictate that a defendant not
be penalized unless a plaintiff in like circumstances is subject to sanc-
tions. Frivolous complaints, just as frivolous defenses, should warrant
the award of attorneys' fees; the good faith of either party should shield
it from paying the fee of opposing counsel. Finally, as implicitly stated
in Hall v. Cole, ° when a fund is produced, counsel fees, as any other
contingent recovery, should be compensated from that fund with deduc-
tions or adjustments made for fee agreements between plaintiff and his
attorney. Title VII should not be a lawyers' relief act; these recommen-
dations, if adopted, would bring some degree of justice into the award of
attorneys' fees.
217. Id. at 867.
218. 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970).
219. 367 F. Supp. at 868. See also Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 1974-1975
CCH F-n. SEC. L. RP. 94,971 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
220. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). But see Burlington Northern Inc. v. American Ry. Super-
visors As'n, 527 F.2d 216, 222 (7th Cir. 1975), denying a fee award but stating that
the purpose of fee-shifting under section 3 of the Railway Labor Act is "to redress the
imbalance in the wealth of the parties."
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